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Abstract
Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which
preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only
attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in
Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality,
according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those
she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other than
preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately
supports a different interpretation of preference.
Keywords Decision theory · Preference · Rational requirements
1 Introduction
At the most general level, normative decision theory requires agents to have (or be
representable as having) consistent preferences, and to choose in accordance with their
preferences. But what are preferences, and what is the nature of these rational require-
ments? This paper offers an explication and a critique of an interpretation of normative
decision theory developed in Bradley (2017) Decision Theory with a Human Face,
which I will call ‘judgementalism’. According to judgementalism, preferences are
judgements of relative desirability, and are the only attitudes that rationally constrain
choice.
Extending Jeffrey-Bolker decision theory, Bradley’s book provides a powerful
decision theoretic framework that can not only accommodate conditional attitudes,
decision-making under various different kinds of uncertainty, and decision-making by
agents that are bounded in various ways, but also yields several other decision theories
(Savage, von Neumann-Morgenstern, and causal decision theory), as special cases.
B Johanna Thoma
j.m.thoma@lse.ac.uk
1 Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science,
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The book is moreover admirably explicit about its methodology and the intended
interpretation of the core concepts of the decision theory it develops. While it is a very
common conviction amongst decision theorists that preferences should be understood
to be kinds of judgements, this interpretation of preference has rarely been defended
as explicitly and in as much detail in the context of normative decision theory as in
Bradley’s book.1 It thus presents an opportunity for a critical discussion that I hope is
of wider interest. Moreover, as we will see, our discussion will have important impli-
cations not only for what kinds of rational constraints are captured by Bradley’s and
other standard theories of unbounded rationality, but also for the analysis of bounded
rationality, which is a core concern of Bradley’s book.
I take judgementalism to be the conjunction of the following three claims: First,
preferences are understood to be all-things-considered judgements about the relative
desirability of different prospects. It is in relation to this interpretation of preference
that Bradley himself introduces the term ‘judgementalist’ (p. 46). The second and
third claims justify applying the term ‘judgementalist’ to the interpretation of norma-
tive decision theory more generally, as they assert the centrality of preferences within
normative decision theory. The second claim is that binary preferences (along with
judgements of relative credibility) take conceptual, explanatory and methodological
priority over any numerical degrees of desirability or belief. And third, and con-
nectedly, only an agent’s preferences, that is, her judgements of relative desirability,
directly rationally constrain her choices. The first is a claim about the interpretation
of preference in terms of judgements, the second asserts that preferences serve as the
theoretical foundation of decision theory, and the third asserts their primacy in deter-
mining rational choice. Bradley endorses each of these claims in at least some parts
of the book. My primary aim here is to consider the merits of this package of views,
even though, as will become apparent in the following, it is not clear whether Bradley
fully endorses each of these judgementalist claims in all parts of the book.
A core motivation for Bradley in endorsing each of the elements of judgementalism,
I will show, is the idea that rational requirements supervene on agents’ mental states.
That is, they capture a subjective kind of ‘ought’, ‘ought’ in the light of an agent’s
beliefs, desires, and judgements. I will call this view internalism about the require-
ments of rationality. I will grant internalism about the requirements of rationality for
the purposes of this paper. But internalism, I will show, does not entail judgementalism.
There are attitudes other than preferences, as they are operationalised in normative
decision theory, and understood in the judgementalist sense, that internalists can recog-
nise as potential constraints on choice. Moreover, I will argue that they should do so,
undermining the third judgementalist claim.
If attitudes other than preferences in the judgementalist sense can rationally con-
strain choice in their own right, then, I will argue, normative decision theory is better
off also giving up the first, and central commitment of judgementalism, namely that
preferences are judgements. I will propose an alternative that I think suits the internal-
ist better, according to which preference is a relation that tracks all-things-considered
subjective desirability, that is, desirability in the light of all the agent’s relevant atti-
1 Hausman (2012) offers an extensive defence in the context of descriptive and explanatory uses of decision
theory, in particular in economics. See my Thoma (2019a, b) for critical discussion.
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tudes. Crucially, preferences in this sense can be ascribed whether the agent has made
a (correct) all-things-considered judgement of desirability or not (though she could
arrive at a correct judgement through ideal deliberation).
2 Judgementalism
The decision theory developed in Decision Theory with a Human Face proposes, as all
major decision theories do, that agents should choose in line with their preferences, that
is, in the ideal case, choose one of their most preferred options (the “Choice Principle”,
p. 25). Moreover—and this is what most of the discussion focuses on—a rational and
unbounded agent’s preferences should have a certain kind of structure, whereby they
can be thought of as tracking the expectation of a numerical measure of desirability or
utility (the “Rationality Hypothesis”, p. 21). Bradley provides a representation theorem
that shows that an agent’s preferences can be given such a desirability representation if
and only if they abide by certain axioms—some of which Bradley goes on to relax later
in the book to make room, e.g., for incomplete preference and imprecision. Preference
is a binary relation, and notably, in Bradley’s framework, preference, just like the binary
‘at least as credible as’ relation, can have as its object any ‘prospect’, which could be
a state of affairs, an outcome, an action, as well as a conditional possibility. Moreover,
in the formal framework proposed, prospects are propositions which form an atomless
Boolean algebra. My main concern here is the judgementalist interpretation Bradley
gives to his framework. The following subsections will elaborate on each of the core
commitments of judgementalism in turn.
2.1 Preferences are judgements
That preferences are to be understood as kinds of judgements is a claim Bradley returns
to whenever the interpretation of his framework is explicitly discussed. Regarding
the question of what these are judgements of, he primarily speaks of judgements of
desirability (p. 28), but also of choice-worthiness (p. 47), betterness (p. 47), or benefit.
However, in each of the latter three cases, it is made explicit that he has in mind
choice-worthiness or value or benefit in light of the agent’s beliefs and desires. And
likewise, the intended notion of desirability is presumably desirability of a prospect
for the agent as an object of choice. According to judgementalism about preferences,
preferences are judgements by an agent that some prospect a is more desirable than
another prospect b as a potential object of choice for the agent. Bradley also stresses at
various points (e.g. on p. 46) that preferences are meant to be ‘all-things-considered’
judgements that reflect all of an agent’s relevant reasons, agreeing here with Hausman
(2012).
Two caveats should be noted. At one point in the book (pp. 46–47), Bradley
proposes a ‘hybrid’ account of preference, whereby preferences are not only all-things-
considered judgements of desirability, but also need to be instantiated in dispositions
to choose. He there notes, “that they are also dispositions to choose both explains the
connection between preference and choice and fixes the sense of betterness (namely
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as choice-worthiness) characteristic of preference judgements.” (p. 47) However, the
Choice Principle arguably already explains the connection between preference and
choice insofar as agents are rational, and fixes the sense of betterness characteris-
tic of preference judgements—which also distinguishes preferences from other kinds
of evaluative judgement. Given that the judgemental element of the hybrid account
already removes the main potential advantage of dispositional accounts of preference,
namely their parsimony, the addition of a dispositional element in Bradley’s account
of preference seems unnecessarily restrictive. I will focus on the purely judgemental
interpretation of preference in the following.
Secondly, Bradley defends the judgementalist account of preference primarily when
decision theory is applied from the first person perspective, that is, when an agent is
deliberating about what to do. While from the first person perspective, preferences are
judgements of relative desirability, and, by the second judgementalist claim, utilities
are graded judgements of of desirability, Bradley allows that from the third person
perspective, preferences and utilities are given a different interpretation. Namely, they
could be interpreted as denoting relative desire and degrees of desire respectively,
rather than judgements about them (p. 28). He dubs this the ‘mental state interpretation’
of preference, and takes it to be different from judgementalism:
On the judgement interpretation, [the maximisation hypothesis] says that ratio-
nality requires of agents that they judge actions to be desirable to the degree
that they can be expected to have desirable consequences, given how likely they
judge the possible states of the world to be and how desirable they judge pos-
sible consequences. Similarly, on the mental state interpretation, the hypothesis
says that an agent is rational only if the value she attaches to each action is its
expected desirability, relative to her degrees of belief and desire. (pp. 28–29)
The mental state interpretation is more permissive, as we can ascribe desires and
beliefs whenever we can identify something that plays the causal role of belief or
desire in action explanation. And, to “play this role it is not essential that they be
formed as a result of a conscious judgement on the part of the agent.” (p. 28) But as,
according to Bradley, the formation of a judgement usually leads to the formation of
a corresponding belief and desire, from the third person perspective, we might think
of the judgement interpretation as just picking out special cases of the mental state
interpretation.
As we will also see more in the following, for Bradley it is the first person perspective
that is crucial for normative decision theory as a theory of rationality: Requirements
of rationality are meant to be helpful to agents deliberating about what to do. And
in the case of first person deliberation, Bradley takes the mental state interpretation
to be inadequate. This is because an agent who is deliberating about what to do is
not, or at least not only, looking inward to determine what her desires are, but rather
is trying to figure out what options are actually valuable or desirable. In doing so,
she makes judgements about the value or desirability of options. This value could
be objective—Bradley is explicitly not committed to subjectivism about value. (pp.
29–30)
Aside from this distinction from the mental state interpretation, most of Bradley’s
defence of judgementalism focuses on its advantages over two more radically different
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rivals: Interpretations that propose an objective or empirical interpretation of utility
as, e.g., well-being or some other value; and choice-theoretic or dispositional accounts
of preference and utility. Bradley’s case against objectivist interpretations of utility is
one of the key instances where he appeals to what we will call internalism about the
requirements of rationality.
On an objectivist interpretation of utility (and probability), standard decision theory
would require agents to choose what in fact maximises expected well-being or value.
But, according to Bradley, rationality cannot require an agent to do what is in fact
expected to maximise well-being or value if she has false beliefs or makes mistaken
judgements of (objective) value. For Bradley, rationality concerns only the questions of
what it means for an agent to make consistent judgements, and to make the best choices
given the judgements she has made. This is clearly compatible with making mistaken
value judgements. All we can ask of agents is that they make the best choices given their
judgements of credibility and desirability: “We are where we are, with the judgements
that we have arrived at, and at the moment when the decision must be made the best
that we can do is act consistently on the basis of those judgements.” (p. 27) Bradley’s
remarks here exhibit an internalist conception of the requirements of rationality, which
takes them to supervene on agents’ mental states. Rationality cannot require different
things of two agents who have the same state of mind. More specifically, for Bradley,
the requirements of rationality supervene on the agent’s judgements of desirability
and credibility.2
Bradley’s core defence against the proponent of choice-theoretic interpretations
of preference as disposition to choose is that only mental states and judgements, not
choices, are “the sorts of things that are susceptible to rationality conditions.” (p.
46) Given the Choice Principle does rationally constrain choice, Bradley must have
in mind here the rational consistency conditions of the Rationality Hypothesis. In
line with the third defining claim of judgementalism, the idea is that choice is only
rationally constrained by preference judgements, and not subject to its own consistency
conditions.
2.2 Preferences are prior
The second defining claim of judgementalism is that preferences and judgements of
relative credibility have conceptual, explanatory and methodological priority over any
numerical notions featuring in decision theory, such as utilities, or, in Bradley’s frame-
work, desirabilities and probabilities. They are thus the fundamental relations decision
theory is based on. Bradley calls this view ‘pragmatism’ (p. 43). Methodological pri-
ority is given to preferences as they typically form the empirical basis for ascription
of the quantitative notions. And conceptual priority is given to preference because the
properties of rational preference are supposed to explain the properties of the quanti-
tative notions. Against the background of one’s favoured representation theorem, the
plausibility of the axioms on preference is supposed to explain the properties of the
desirability or utility functions that capture the preferences. This is a natural view to
2 That this kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality is compatible with objectivism about
value is argued in Asarnow (2016).
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take when, as Bradley does, one takes the rationality conditions on relational attitudes
like preference to have more intuitive appeal than the properties of quantitative notions
like utility, probability and desirability.
Bradley provides two further considerations in favour of pragmatism. One is that
“agents are not typically in a position to make precise numerical cognitive or evaluative
judgements. Nor does rationality require that they do so.” (p. 72) If agents are more
often in a position to make relational judgements of relative desirability or credibility,
this seems to count in favour of pragmatism. Secondly, Bradley argues that models
formulated in terms of quantitative notions like desirability and probability will arise
as a special case of relational ones: If preferences are complete and consistent, then a
quantitative model representing them can be generated. If they are not, there will be
no precise quantitative model. Given this latter possibility, relational models also have
greater generality. (pp. 72–73)
While Bradley is quite clear about his judgementalism about preference, and about
taking preferences to be conceptually and explanatorily prior to the quantitative notion
of desirability, I’d like to point out here an important ambiguity regarding how quanti-
tative desirabilities are to be interpreted. Quantitative desirabilities are measures that
make it meaningful to compare the size differences between options. Yet, they are
meant to be conceptually derivative of binary judgements. Despite the name, on the
judgementalist picture, we can’t think of these desirabilities as a measure of actual
desirability, that is, of the thing preferences are meant to be judgements of. If they
were, then preference, which is a judgement of desirability, would not be conceptu-
ally and explanatorily prior to it. Unless, that is, judgements of desirability are what
determines desirability. However, as we have just seen, Bradley explicitly rejects such
subjectivism about value.3
But it is not entirely clear how else we should think of quantitative desirabilities
within a judgementalist framework. Elsewhere (Bradley 2004), Bradley suggests that
desirabilities track degrees of preference, and that thus preference has more than a
binary structure after all. But it is not clear how we should think of degrees of preference
when preferences are judgements. Two possibilities are the following: First, we could
think of them as a measure of degrees of desirability, as judged by the agent, that
is, as expressing the agent’s judgements about degrees of desirability rather than just
about orders of desirability. Second, we could think of them as expressing degrees of
judgement of desirability. In the first case, it is the desirability (as judged by the agent)
that is graded. In the second case, it is the judgement itself that is graded.
An interpretation along the second lines would require further explication, as it is
not immediately obvious what it would mean to make a judgement of degree x that
some option a is desirable, and whether judgements come in degrees at all. It would be
implausible for such degrees to track the confidence with which a judgement is made,
since agents might be equally confident in all their evaluative judgements, even if some
of them are represented by lower utility assignments. At least an agent can be equally
confident in all her relational judgements, i.e. preferences, and then it is unclear again
3 Moreover, even if the agent’s relational judgements of desirability always tracked actual desirability, it
would still be unclear why the quantities that represent an agent’s judgements of relative desirability as per
the representation theorem should at the same time provide a quantitative measure of actual desirability, as
opposed to simply a quantitative measure of judgements of desirability.
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how these relational judgements should be explanatorily and conceptually prior to
ascriptions of varying degrees of confidence in one’s evaluative judgements.
The first judgementalist interpretation of utility/desirability is somewhat easier to
make sense of, and it seems plausible that relational judgements about orders of desir-
ability should be explanatorily and conceptually prior to judgements of degrees of
desirability. But the more fundamental problem with both ways of thinking of desir-
abilities or utilities as capturing some kind of graded judgement is that ascribing
utilities and desirabilities to an agent now means ascribing additional judgements
to her, different from the relational judgements we started out with. We can either
think of judgements as necessarily conscious, or as potentially unconscious, implicit
in other judgements we have made. If they are necessarily conscious, it’s implausible
that the desirability and utility assignments yielded by the representation theorems
should always represent quantitative judgements. After all, an agent who makes con-
sistent relational judgements can conceivably not make any conscious quantitative
judgements at all. In fact, as we have just seen, one of the reasons Bradley endorses
pragmatism to begin with is that agents are often in a position to make relational judge-
ments when they can’t make precise numerical judgements, at least not consciously.
This problem would be avoided if we thought of judgements as not necessarily
conscious. At one point (p. 65), Bradley indeed suggests that judgements need not be
conscious. But in many parts of the book, Bradley relies on judgements being neces-
sarily conscious. As noted above, he appeals to conscious awareness of judgements to
distinguish judgementalism from mental state accounts. Moreover, much of the book
is concerned with the representation of incomplete preferences, where preferences
are incomplete when agents have not made up their mind about an issue, for instance
because they have not thought about it due to cognitive limitations (pp. 225–226). The
standard for preference ascription Bradley applies here thus seems to presuppose a
conscious judgement. Lastly, and most importantly for our discussion, for the most
part, Bradley considers normative decision theory from the first person perspective,
as a tool for decision makers to figure out what to do. And decision makers can only
reason from the judgements they are conscious of. In fact, we will see in the next sec-
tion that appealing to the connection of rationality to reasoning and action-guidance
is the most plausible case for internalism about rational requirements, which serves
as a justification for other judgementalist claims.
Thus, some of Bradley’s central claims rely on judgements being necessarily con-
scious, but in that case, the claim that desirability and utility ascriptions denote
additional kinds of judgements seems undermined. A final possibility is that quan-
titative desirabilities are not a measure of anything graded at all, but rather merely a
convenient way of representing relational judgements of desirability. This corresponds
to what is arguably the standard interpretation of utility in the economics literature,
which sees utility as a mere convenient representation of preference.4 On this view,
there would be no implication at all that desirabilities track degrees of judgement,
or degrees of desirability as judged by the agent. The quantitative measure would
express only facts about the structure of the agent’s relational judgements. Pragma-
tism not only makes sense, but indeed is implicit in this interpretation of quantitative
4 See, e.g., Binmore (2008, pp. 19–22) on the ‘causal utility fallacy’.
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desirabilities and utilities. I thus take this to be the best way forward for the judge-
mentalist. However, this third possibility appears to be rejected by Bradley: He thinks
that desirabilities are a quantitative measure of some graded attitude.
All in all, then, there is tension between Bradley’s pragmatism, the commitment
that judgements are conscious implicit in some central arguments in the book, and
his insistence that desirabilities and utilities represent some graded attitude. Given I
am treating pragmatism as a central claim of judgementalism, and the central role
of internalism about rationality in justifying judgementalism, I think it is the latter
that should be given up by the judgementalist. I will set these complications aside for
now, however. What is crucial about pragmatism from a judgementalist perspective
is that quantitative notions such as utility or desirability do not rationally constrain
preference, because preference is explanatorily prior to these. According to the third
judgementalist claim, discussed in the next section, they also do not constrain choice
in their own right—only preference does so.
2.3 Only preferences constrain choice
The final defining claim of the judgementalist position is that only preferences, con-
ceived of as relational judgements, directly constrain choices. Bradley proposes the
Choice Principle, and only the Choice Principle as a rational requirement on an
unbounded agent’s choices, and the Choice Principle asks agents to choose one of
their most preferred options. The Choice Principle has to be relaxed in cases of incom-
plete preferences. But here, too, the recommendations of the potential choice rules
discussed by Bradley supervene on the imprecise utility representation of the agent,
which in turn, given pragmatism, is simply derived from the preferences the agent
does have. Preferences themselves are only constrained by other preferences and rela-
tional judgements of credibility. This is the view Bradley calls, following Broome
(1991), ‘moderate Humeanism’.5 Despite the initial appearance that the Rationality
Hypothesis constrains preferences by requiring them to conform to the expectation of
benefit, Bradley conceives of the Rationality Hypothesis as merely a requirement of
consistency on preferences. In line with the representation theorems, agents should
have preferences that are representable as expected desirability/utility maximising.
Why think that only preferences in the judgementalist sense constrain choices? The
lazy answer is that this just follows from the first two judgementalist claims in com-
bination with what the formal framework of normative decision theory gives us—one
which has proven to be very fruitful, as Bradley’s book amply demonstrates. But to
say more, we can appeal again to internalism about the requirements of rationality. As
we already saw above, Bradley appears to be committed specifically to the view that
rational requirements supervene on judgements, from which it follows that only judge-
ments rationally constrain choice. Preferences being kinds of judgements according to
5 The appeal to Humeanism is slightly misleading given the role Bradley grants to objective value.
Humeanism in practical reason is usually associated with the idea that reasons need to have some basis
in desire. See, e.g., Schroeder (2007). But Bradley seems to allow for the possibility that judgements of
objective value provide reasons for action even in the absence of a desire, or even if a corresponding desire
only arises because of the judgement of objective value.
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the first judgementalist claim, this might be seen to support this third judgementalist
claim.
Let me sum up the judgementalist interpretation of decision theory and Bradley’s
motivations for endorsing it. According to judgementalism, preferences are all-
things-considered relational judgements of desirability, they are conceptually and
explanatorily prior to, and not rationally constrained by any quantitative notions
like utility and desirability, and only preferences thus interpreted rationally constrain
choices. That preferences are judgements rather than desires is motivated by a rejec-
tion of subjectivism about value, as deliberating agents are attempting to figure out,
not determine what is in fact desirable. And that they are judgements rather than
tracking objective value directly is motivated by internalism about rational require-
ments, according to which rational requirements supervene on mental states, and in
particular judgements. The judgementalist claim that preferences are conceptually and
explanatorily prior to quantitative desirabilities and utilities is motivated by the claims
that rationality conditions on relational judgements have greater intuitive appeal, that
we more easily make relational than quantitative judgements, and that starting from
relational judgements yields the more general theory. And the judgementalist claim
that only preferences constrain choices is motivated again by internalism about the
requirements of rationality.
On this picture, normative decision theory is meant to govern decision-making from
the first person perspective, which is assumed to proceed roughly as follows: To choose
rationally, I must choose in line with my all-things-considered judgements about what
it would be most desirable to do. When making these judgements, my aim is to correctly
capture what is in fact desirable, not, or at least not exclusively to determine what is
desirable. But when figuring out what all-things-considered judgement of desirability
to make, all I can subjectively appeal to are other judgements I have made—of relative
desirability and of relative credibility. If rationality only imposes subjective norms,
then these can only be norms that appeal to consistency among my judgements, and
consistency of my choices with my judgements. The best I can do is make a judgement
that is consistent with my other judgements, and then act accordingly. And, crucially,
requirements on the preferences and credibility judgements as they feature in the
formal framework of normative decision theory are supposed to fully capture this
picture of rational choice.
3 Motivations for internalism about requirements of rationality
Internalism about rational requirements is central to the justification of judgemen-
talism. Preferences should not be understood in terms of some objective measure of
desirability, because agents may not know what is actually most desirable. If rational
requirements need to supervene on mental states, then no rational requirements should
be formulated directly in terms of an objective measure of desirability. Instead, Bradley
holds, preferences should be understood as judgements, which are mental states. That
preferences in the judgementalist sense should be the only things that constrain choice
also seems to be motivated by a kind of internalism about rational requirements. In this
Sect. 1 consider what might be a plausible justification for internalism about rational
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requirements, which points to what a plausible internalism would look like. This then
serves as the basis for my argument, in the following sections, that internalism does
not imply judgementalism, and that internalists in fact shouldn’t be judgementalists
about normative decision theory.
The most explicit defence Bradley gives of internalism about rational requirements
appeals to a kind of ‘ought implies can’ thesis (p. 27). That defence, however, seems
to overshoot its target. What he seems to have in mind is something like the following:
If, in order to non-accidentally choose in accordance with some ‘ought’ claim, I need
to know something I don’t know and can’t figure out on the basis of the beliefs and
preferences I have, then the ‘ought’ claim can’t apply to me. Or at least, this ‘ought
implies can’ claim is true of the rational ‘ought’. The problem with this version of
‘ought implies can’ is that it rules out too much. In particular, it would imply that
it is not true that those who have false views about the requirements of rationality
themselves—such as the requirements of consistency Bradley defends—rationally
ought to abide by the true requirements of rationality. But presumably Bradley wants
to say that agents rationally ought to abide by the requirements of rationality, whether
they can know what they are or not. For instance, an agent with intransitive preferences
who does not believe intransitivity to be irrational would, presumably, still be regarded
irrational by Bradley. Otherwise, it seems, his theory would only be normative for the
kinds of agents that already believe in it.
It thus can’t be characteristic of the kind of normativity theories of rationality are
about that it is constrained by the kind of ‘ought implies can’ claim just described.
We can’t avoid distinguishing between the kinds of mistaken attitudes or judgements
that rationally exculpate, and those that don’t. At the very least, mistaken views about
rationality don’t seem to rationally exculpate (just as mistaken views about morality
don’t ordinarily morally exculpate). What the judgementalist wants to say, presumably,
is that being mistaken about the requirements of rationality, and being mistaken on the
basis of inconsistency are the only kinds of mistaken attitudes that do not rationally
exculpate. Mistaken views about morality, on the other hand, do—it is not a rational
mistake to have the wrong objective values.
Instead of an ‘ought implies can’ thesis, I think the most plausible way to justify this
is to insist that the purpose of rational norms and requirements is to give first-personal
guidance, and that rationality thus must be connected to reasoning in a particular way:
The advice the theory of rationality gives must be advice the agent can follow without
any further external input. Once she knows what the requirements of rationality are,
she must be able to figure out how to abide by them through reasoning on the basis
of her existing attitudes alone. Moreover, in the context of normative decision theory,
which ultimately aims at choice, rational requirements should be action-guiding, so
that they help agents figure out what to do on the basis of reasoning from their existing
mental states.
In addition to being implied by Bradley at various points in his book, this kind of
view is indeed common in the literature on rationality. Recently, Broome (2013) has
defended both the views that requirements of rationality supervene on the mind, and
that rationality is essentially connected to reasoning. The specific kind of internalism
about rational requirements that results from this view of rationality is that rational
requirements supervene on not just any mental state, but rather just the kinds of mental
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states that we can reason from—otherwise there might be rational requirements that
agents cannot figure out how to abide by through reasoning.6
Preferences in the judgementalist sense, and judgements of relative credibility
arguably are such attitudes we can reason from, at least if we take them to be necessar-
ily conscious. The problem for judgementalism is that they are not the only attitudes
we can reason from. Internalism thus does not imply judgementalism. The next two
sections will argue that in fact the internalist about rational requirements should allow
for attitudes other than judgementalist preferences to constrain choice. I will argue that,
while this does not necessarily commit decision theory to starting to explicitly model
these other kinds of attitudes, it does undermine the judgementalist interpretation of
decision theory.
4 Rational norms about decision frames
The first problem for the internalist justification of judgementalism I would like to
raise is that requirements formulated in terms of the kinds of judgements Bradley takes
preferences to be are not actually action-guiding on their own. They are only action-
guiding in conjunction with requirements appealing to other kinds of mental states.
The source of the problem is that agents must first represent the decision problem they
are facing in some way before knowing which of their judgements are even relevant
for determining what to do. That is, they must specify what the prospects are they are
choosing between.
It is generally acknowledged that there are better or worse ways of representing
one’s decision problems. In fact Bradley’s book contains a fairly detailed discussion
of the problem of how to frame one’s decision problems (pp. 13–16). He presents this
problem in terms of a trade-off between quality and efficiency of choice. Efficiency
is about minimising the cognitive labour of decision-making, and generally speaks
against decision frames that are too complex. Quality, on the other hand, depends
on including as many relevant features in the description of the decision problem as
possible. Bradley here speaks of the need to include the most relevant features of the
possible outcomes of choices that matter to agents, and features of the environment
on which the outcomes depend, as the “correctness” of the decision depends on this
(p. 14).
These remarks seem eminently reasonable. However, they also arguably commit
Bradley to rational constraints on choice other than preferences in the judgementalist
sense. First of all, the kinds of norms in question here seem to evidently be norms
of rationality. Bradley speaks of the correctness of a decision depending on including
the most relevant features of outcomes, where presumably the sense of correctness
is rational correctness. When an agent strikes a grossly inadequate balance between
efficiency and quality in formulating her choice problem, that is, fails to include the
most important features of her decision situation, and then acts on her judgements
regarding this decision problem, this seems to be a rational failing—what other kind
of failing would it be? When I frame my decision problem regarding whether or not
6 Lee (2018) argues on this basis that rational requirements govern only occurrent mental states.
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to take an umbrella without taking into account whether or not it is going to rain
(even though I have beliefs about the weather, and I take it to be highly relevant to my
choice), my resulting choice will be straightforwardly irrational unless it happens to
coincide with what I would have judged had I taken everything relevant into account.
It will be irrational even if my judgements are coherent and I act in accordance with the
Choice Principle. Norms about framing thus introduce additional rational constraints
on choice.
Importantly, these failings can be rational failings even for the internalist, as long
as the norms about framing can themselves be specified in internalist terms. They
arguably can be formulated in internalist terms. But, problematically for the judgemen-
talist, we can’t express these norms in terms of only preferences in the judgementalist
sense. Following remarks about including in prospect description features that ‘mat-
ter’ to agents, when elaborating on what makes a feature relevant to include, Bradley
writes, “[a] feature of the state of the world or of a consequence is relevant to a decision
problem if the choice of action is sensitive to values that we might reasonably assign to
this feature (its probability or utility).” (p. 15) Given the judgementalist commitment
to pragmatism, which takes preferences to be conceptually and explanatorily prior to
utility and desirability, one might attempt to reduce this to a claim about preferences
in the judgementalist sense: A feature is relevant to include when the agent’s judge-
ments are very sensitive to its inclusion in the description of the decision problem.
But this would be in conflict with Bradley’s reasonable comments about efficiency of
decision-making: On this reading, agents can only make relevance assessments when
they can appeal to their judgements regarding more complex representations of a deci-
sion problem. But if they can appeal to those already, there is no efficiency tradeoff in
adopting a more complex representation. However, this efficiency tradeoff is indeed
very real, as in fact we don’t standardly come equipped with judgements about very
complex prospects.
One could adopt a hypothetical judgement reading of relevance now, and suppose
that a factor is relevant if it would significantly impact the agent’s judgements. But
appealing to hypothetical judgements would make relevance something that cannot
be directly assessed or determined by the agent by reasoning from the attitudes and
judgements she actually starts out with. Relevance norms for the specification of
decision problems would thus violate internalism about rational requirements.
Judgementalism meets a dead end here. Judgementalism is motivated in large part
by internalism about the requirements of rationality, and the idea that any norms of
rationality need to be action-guiding. But in order for decision theory to be action-
guiding, we need norms about the framing of decision problems. And these cannot
plausibly be formulated in purely judgementalist terms, at least not without giving up
internalism about the requirements of rationality. Within an internalist framework, the
best way forward, I suggest, is to take attitudes regarding relevance to be an additional
kind of attitude, different from preference, that introduces its own rational constraints.
On the view I want to suggest, when deliberating about a decision, agents start out
with attitudes (let them be judgements) about which of the properties of their choice
situation matter to them, and with views about which of them are more important
than others. On the basis of these judgements, and taking into account efficiency, they
formulate their decision problem, which specifies the prospects to be chosen between.
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They then make/consult their judgements about which prospect is most desirable. What
is important here is that the initial judgements of relevance can not be preferences in
the decision-theoretic sense, as they do not have prospects as their object. Rather, they
have as their object properties of the agent’s choice situation as the agent perceives it. In
fact, we can consult these judgements before we have even formulated what prospects
we are choosing between. They concern not prospects, but candidate properties for
being included in the description of the prospects we are choosing between. So norms
about framing appeal to attitudes other than preferences over prospects, and we said
these norms introduce additional rational constraints on choice, other than coherence
norms on preference and the Choice Principle. If choice is rationally constrained by
attitudes other than judgementalist preference, we need to give up the third defining
feature of judgementalism.
An example will help in bringing out the difference between preferences and the
judgements of relevance I have in mind. Suppose I am trying to figure out what boat
to buy. It might be initially hard for me to compare the various different boats on
offer, but I might have a clear idea about the properties of the boat that matter to
me, say, price, longevity, performance, and design aesthetics. And I might have some
idea about the factors that affect these, e.g., the condition of the wood and the sail.
These can then inform the formulation of the prospects involved in choosing one of
the boats on offer. These prospects should include descriptions of all the properties of
the choice situation that I have judged significantly relevant. Once I have formulated
the prospects, I can form, or consult a judgement about the relative desirability of
prospects thus described. But my original judgements about the properties that are
important to me are not judgements concerning prospects. They concern properties
of my choice situation, and thus candidates for the inclusion in the description of
prospects.7
For decision theory to be action-guiding in the way the internalist about rational
requirements would like it to be, we thus must give up the third judgementalist claim
and allow for attitudes other than preferences to constrain choices. If we relax this
claim along the lines I have suggested, there is a particular kind of irrational choice
that stems not from a failure to act in accordance with one’s preferences understood
as one’s judgements of desirability, or a failure of consistency in preference. It stems
from the failure to take into account properties of one’s choice situation that matter to
oneself, that one judges relevant, when formulating one’s decision problem.
This was the first core reason I want to present for rejecting judgementalism, and in
particular its third defining claim. One might think that this just commits us to a minor
relaxation of judgementalism. We will see below why this relaxation is not as minor
as it might seem. For now, note also that once we have acknowledged that preferences
are not the only attitudes that constrain choices in this one respect, further constraints
from other sources become salient. As has already played a role here, one thing that
is special about the attitudes the judgementalist takes to be the only attitude rationally
constraining choices is that they are judgements that have prospects as their objects.
7 The next section will discuss in more detail why attitudes to properties of prospects can’t be reduced to
attitudes to prospects.
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But agents may be constrained by attitudes, including judgements, about objects that
are not prospects. The next section argues that this is more generally so.
5 What all-things-considered judgements are based on
The relevance judgements just discussed are one type of attitude that do not have
prospects as their object, but that nevertheless seem to rationally constrain us. To see
that there are other such attitudes, consider the fact that Bradley takes preferences to
be ‘all-things-considered’ judgements. This raises the question of what the things are
that are considered when we are making these judgements. The term suggests that we
are reasoning from various different considerations to an overall evaluation. If we are
reasoning from these, they must be attitudes the internalist can at least in principle
appeal to when formulating requirements of rationality. Intuitively, what we do is take
into account all the relevant subjective reasons (reasons as we see them) for favouring
one prospect or another. For instance, when I decide which boat to buy, I consider my
subjective reasons relating to the price, longevity, performance and design aesthetics
of the boats on offer.
The problem for judgementalism now is that the attitudes that pick out these sub-
jective reasons can’t be preferences as they are understood in Bradley’s framework.
For one, if preferences are all-things-considered judgements, then surely they are
based on attitudes that are not yet all-things-considered, but rather partial. Moreover,
preferences, in Bradley’s and Jeffrey’s framework, have prospects as their object. As
mentioned above, prospects are modelled as propositions in Bradley’s and Jeffrey’s
frameworks, and form a Boolean algebra. A simple proposition like ‘I own a mahogany
boat’ is equivalent to a disjunction of sub-prospects that form a jointly exhaustive list
of ways in which it might be true that I own a mahogany boat, for instance ‘I own
a mahogany boat and it cost more than the down-payment on a house’ or ‘I own a
mahogany boat and it did not cost more than the down-payment on a house’.
A boat’s being made of mahogany might well be one of the things that I take into
account when making an all-things-considered judgement about what boat to buy.
Suppose I find mahogany aesthetically pleasing in a boat, so I take its being made of
mahogany to count in favour of choosing a particular boat. It is one of my subjective
reasons, in this case one that counts in favour of any mahogany boat. But it would be
a mistake to say that a judgement about the prospect ‘I own a mahogany boat’ is what
makes this a subjective reason to be taken into account when I make an all-things-
considered judgement regarding the prospect of owning a specific mahogany boat,
along with judgements about analogous prospects for the other features I care about,
e.g. ‘I own a leaky boat’. The prospect of owning a specific leaky mahogany boat is
actually a sub-prospect of the prospect ‘I own a mahogany boat’. And so, if anything,
my judgement about the specific leaky mahogany boat is one of the things to consider
when making a judgement about the prospect ‘I own a mahogany boat’, not the other
way around. And my judgement about the prospect ‘I own a mahogany boat’ is going
to be affected by my views about all the mahogany boats that are not leaky, which are
largely irrelevant in this instance. My attitude to the prospect ‘I own a mahogany boat’
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is thus not the kind of thing that would enter as one of many reasons when making an
all-things-considered judgement about a specific mahogany boat.
What all-things-considered judgements are based on, rather, are attitudes that give
us only a partial assessment of a prospect, which can then be combined with other
partial assessments to offer a full assessment. Attitudes to prospects of which the
prospect to be assessed is a sub-prospect are not partial in this way. Instead, all-things-
considered judgements about prospects seem to be based on attitudes to properties—of
the boat, and of any state of affairs where I own it. If we grant that these attitudes are
still desirability judgements, the idea is that not only prospects, but also properties can
be desirable, potential bearers of value. When I judge mahogany boats to be desirable,
I am not making a judgement about the collection of states of the world in which it is
true I own a mahogany boat. I know that any such state of the world will have many
other properties I care about, and that may affect how I evaluate the disjunction of
all those states of affairs. When I express a positive judgement about mahogany, I am
abstracting away from all of those other features.
Suppose I think mahogany boats are overwhelmingly going to be too expensive for
me. I might then judge the prospect ‘I own a mahogany boat’ to be quite undesirable
(the proposition is only likely to be true if I have either bankrupted myself or the boat
is leaky). Or suppose I have some vague and uncertain memory that there may be
ethical or environmental concerns regarding mahogany, and thus withhold judgement
on the prospect of owning a mahogany boat. In both cases, it might still be true that
I judge that, insofar as aesthetics are concerned, its being made of mahogany counts
in favour of any boat under my consideration, and take this into consideration when
making an all-things-considered judgement.
When making an all-things-considered judgement of desirability about some
prospect, we seem to make it on the basis of how desirable we find the properties
of this prospect.8 Another remark about all-things-considered judgements will be
important in the following. And that is that all-things-considered judgements don’t
seem to provide us with additional reasons, on top of the reasons they are based on.
Rather, they aim to establish what the sum of all of our reasons supports. Granted, some
considerations that may form subjective reasons only become apparent when various
different properties interact. Mahogany might be tacky in combination with some boat
designs. But this is best thought of in terms of additional, more complex properties of
the relevant prospect, rather than the all-things-considered judgement adding reasons
for action not contained in the reasons on the basis of which it is formed. All-things-
considered judgements are different in kind from other judgements because they sum
up, rather than provide new subjective reasons.
Some passages in Bradley’s book suggest that he agrees with this picture of all-
things-considered judgements being based on subjective reasons. He speaks explicitly
of preferences being formed on the basis of reasons for favouring one option or the
other (p. 46), and acknowledges that such reasons are different from preferences. He
suggests, however, that this deepens, but does not displace preference-based explana-
tion (p. 161).
8 Also see Pettit (1991) on this observation, although he thinks that attitudes to properties are reducible
to patterns in attitudes to prospects. My Thoma (2019b) discusses further potential implications of this
observation.
123
Synthese
But, as our previous observations about framing, these observations do speak at
least against the third judgementalist commitment, and thus don’t only deepen, but
call for revisions to judgementalist decision theory. At least they do so if we take
there to be rational requirements relating to the attitudes to properties that all-things-
considered judgements are based on that constrain choice in their own right. And there
evidently are such requirements. If I judge a boat all of whose properties (that I judge
relevant) I find highly undesirable to be all-things-considered more desirable than a
boat all of whose properties (that I judge relevant) I find very desirable, I make a
bad judgement. And when I act on this judgement, I make an irrational choice. If I
choose the boat with the (subjectively) undesirable properties over the boat with the
(subjectively) desirable properties, I chose irrationally, even if I made a corresponding
(false) all-things-considered judgement, and even if I made no all-things-considered
judgement at all.
This example was not chosen for its realism, but merely to bring out that there
are rational requirements relating to attitudes to properties, which can directly and
indirectly constrain choice. We might not know what they are in any detail, espe-
cially when it comes to less clear-cut cases. And standard normative decision theory,
which deals in preferences over prospects, does not have anything to say about them.
My argument is not that these need to be explicitly included in formal decision the-
ory. Rather, it is that their existence undermines the judgementalist interpretation of
decision theory. And these requirements are compatible with internalism about the
requirements of rationality, as judgements about properties are attitudes that agents
can reason from, with the help of the relevant rationality principles. Section 7 will
present an alternative non-judgementalist interpretation of standard decision theory
that, I argue, best accommodates the existence of these requirements while remaining
thoroughly internalist. First, however, I want to argue that judgementalism can’t deal
with the problems I have raised with a few minor tweaks.
6 Judgementalist rejoinders
We might be tempted to think that all we need to acknowledge in response to my argu-
ments is that there are additional requirements of rationality that we are leaving out
when we focus only on the Rationality and Choice Principles understood in judgemen-
talist terms. Decision theory, more generally, was never supposed to provide a complete
account of practical rationality, and so this alone is not much of a problem. According
to this view, completing judgementalist decision theory to provide a full account of
rationality is unproblematic: we merely need to add to judgementalist decision theory
additional principles regarding how judgements about properties rationally constrain
all-things-considered judgements. These different kinds of rational requirements, it
might be thought, can be treated largely independently, perhaps by other branches
of philosophy, while retaining the judgementalist interpretation of preference. I think
there are two main ways of making this case: (a) One could hold that standard decision
theoretic requirements of preference consistency and preference-guided choice hold
only for agents who have formed correct all-things-considered judgements. Or (b) one
could suppose that the Choice Principle expresses a narrower kind of ‘ought’ than
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the full rational ‘ought’: It is about doing well in the light of the judgements about
prospects one has formed, be they rational or not.
I don’t think either of these attempts to save judgementalist decision theory is satis-
factory. The difficulty for these views arises because attitudes to properties don’t only
rationally constrain all-things-considered judgements (and thus choice indirectly), but,
as I argued, constrain choices directly as well. This is what creates the conflict with the
third judgementalist commitment. The problem with the two judgementalist rejoin-
ders (a) and (b) just described is best highlighted by considering again two kinds of
cases. First, a case where I make no all-things-considered judgement regarding the
two boats with the overwhelmingly undesirable and overwhelmingly desirable prop-
erties, respectively, at all (and either preference would be consistent with all my other
preferences). And secondly, a case where I have made the wrong all-things-considered
judgement in favour of the boat with the overwhelmingly undesirable properties.
According to (a), decision theory makes no definite recommendation in either case.
The analysis of the first case would depend on whether agents are required to have
formed all relevant all-things-considered judgements, or whether their judgements
can remain incomplete (as Bradley accepts). If it is the former, decision theory does
not apply, and if it is the latter, the agent remains unconstrained in her choice due to
incompleteness. Regarding the second case, featuring a mistaken all-things-considered
judgement, (a) implies decision theoretic requirements don’t apply. A proponent of (a)
might even claim that rational choice is impossible for an agent in such a situation, as
she is in an overall inconsistent judgemental state—as is sometimes claimed of agents
with intransitive preferences. According to (b), decision theory again leaves the agent
in the first case unconstrained in her choice. And in the second case, (b) suggests that
there would be a sense, the narrow, decision theoretic sense, in which the agent should
act on her mistaken all-things-considered judgement, even if she fully rationally ought
not.
But, in line with what I argued in the last section, the following seems to be a better
analysis of these cases: In both cases, I am rationally constrained by my attitudes to the
properties of the boats to pick the one with the overwhelmingly desirable properties.
In the first case, this may or may not involve first forming an all-things-considered
judgement along these lines. In the second case, this may involve counter-judgemental
choice or first revising one’s judgement. And so both (a) and (b) get the first case wrong
by leaving the agent’s choices unconstrained unless she forms an all-things-considered
judgement. (a) gets the second case wrong because it either remains silent or suggests
rational choice is impossible unless the agent revises her judgement. (b)’s analysis
of the second case, on the other hand, is implausible because it is unclear what this
‘ought’ which is narrower than the full rational ‘ought’, and may conflict with the full
rational ‘ought’, should be. I find it hard to see that there should be any sense in which I
ought to act on my mistaken all-things-considered judgement even if I rationally ought
to do something else. Moreover, if possible, such proliferation of different kinds of
‘ought’ should be avoided.
This is not to say that there isn’t something that goes wrong when an agent forms a
mistaken judgement, even if she nevertheless chooses rationally (by choosing counter-
preferentially). She has made a mistaken all-things-considered judgement, and thus
committed an error of reasoning. While her choice was rational in the end, her mental
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processes were not fully rational. But the important point it that the mistaken all-
things-considered judgement neither changes what the agent rationally should do nor
makes rational choice impossible for her. This is because, as we noted above, all-
things-considered judgements don’t create additional reasons for an agent. They are
merely attempts to weigh her various subjective reasons. The judgement about where
the balance of subjective reasons lies does not change where this balance in fact lies.
Where does this leave the judgementalist framework? I think that, at best, what
we can say within a judgementalist framework is that the Choice Principle holds only
conditionally on our all-things-considered judgements standing in the right relations
to our subjective reasons (in line with the relevant rationality requirements). If we
have made (subjectively) correct all-things-considered judgements, then we should
act on them. If not, the rational choice is still the one, or one of the ones that would be
supported by a correct all-things-considered judgement. But if that is the case, it seems
like we can dispense with the Choice Principle, understood in judgementalist terms,
alltogether. We can simply say that rational choice is choice in line with whatever the
correct all-things-considered judgement based on our subjective reasons would be—
regardless of what all-things-considered judgements we have actually made (though
we might still want to independently condemn incorrect judgements as bad reasoning).
Giving up the third defining feature of judgementalism in the way that we have
argued for thus does not only point to the incompleteness of judgementalist decision
theory. It also means one of the central principles of normative decision theory, namely
the Choice Principle and its relaxations under incompleteness, would need to be sub-
stantially qualified, or would even turn out redundant. The next section will argue that
there is a way forward which preserves internalism about the requirements of ratio-
nality, as well as the Choice and Rationality Principles as Bradley develops them. It
moreover allows decision theory to continue to black-box the question of what prefer-
ences are based on if it wishes to, or leave this to other branches of philosophy or the
decision sciences. It thus accommodates both core features of standard decision theory,
as well as a core philosophical commitment about rationality shared by Bradley and
many decision theorists—internalism about the requirements of rationality. However,
it involves giving up the first, and arguably central defining claim of judgementalism.
7 An alternative to judgementalism
On the alternative to judgementalism I wish to suggest to the internalist here, prefer-
ences are not judgements of desirability, but rather track what I will call subjective
all-things-considered desirability. Subjective all-things-considered desirability super-
venes on the agent’s subjective reasons, the reasons the agent recognises on the basis of
her beliefs and judgements of desirability (where these have as their object properties).
Agents can determine what is subjectively all-things-considered desirable by reason-
ing on the basis of their subjective reasons. Still, the important difference between this
view of preference and the judgementalist one is that it ascribes preferences to agents
independently of what all-things-considered judgements they actually make, if they
make one at all. Preference itself does not track a specific attitude or judgement of
the agent’s, but rather tracks what all-things-considered judgement they should arrive
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at ideally through deliberation on the basis of their subjective reasons. If there is no
unique all-things-considered judgement that is supported by the agent’s subjective
reasons, this could be captured by an imprecise framework as Bradley develops it.
If we apply the Rationality and Choice Principles to this interpretation of pref-
erence (in the unbounded case), normative decision theory requires that subjective
desirability abides by the consistency axioms of the theory, e.g. that relational subjec-
tive desirability is transitive, and that agents should act so as to maximise subjective
desirability. Note that normative decision theory based on this interpretation of prefer-
ence still expresses only internal rational requirements. Agents have the resources to
figure out what is subjectively most desirable by consulting their subjective reasons,
and the requirements of rationality. If they make a mistake in doing so, this is a rational
failing. Even if they don’t know what the requirements of rationality are—and indeed
little has been said on how all-things-considered subjective desirability of prospects
relates to judgements about and attitudes to properties—not acting in accordance with
what is subjectively most desirable is still a rational failing. To connect this to our
earlier discussion, mistaken judgements of subjective desirability do not rationally
exculpate (even if mistaken judgements about objective value do).
The advantage of this interpretation of preference is that the Rationality and Choice
Principles now accommodate the ways in which we have argued relevance judgements
and attitudes to properties of prospects constrain choice: An agent who acts on a mis-
taken all-things-considered judgement, or fails to make the correct choice when she
has not made the all-things-considered judgement that tracks subjective desirability,
would run afoul of the reconceived Choice Principle. Our earlier worries about framing
can also be naturally accommodated now. Choosing the option with highest subjec-
tive all-things-considered desirability is naturally interpreted as choosing the option
that is most desirable taking into account everything one judges relevant, that is, all
one’s relevant subjective reasons. When applying normative decision theory under this
interpretation, prospects should thus be described in a way that captures everything
the agent judges relevant. And then when an agent fails to take into account some
factor she judges relevant in her reasoning process, she is again likely to run afoul of
the Choice Principle. The advantage of this interpretation of preference is thus that
the Choice Principle accurately parses rational from irrational choice for any kind of
irrationality internalists should recognise.
This is not to say that normative decision theory isn’t still incomplete. To give a
complete characterisation of the requirements of rationality, we would have to know
how subjective reasons and all-things-considered desirability relate, and I have not
filled this in. But given that the kinds of irrational choices stemming from mistaken
formation of all-things-considered judgement and inadequate framing are rational
failings and should be recognised as such by the internalist (whether we can specify
what requirements they violate or not), it is best to make room for them in a way
that doesn’t let them undermine the recommendations of the Choice Principle. The
resulting decision theory does not need to be qualified or restricted to agents who have
not made such mistakes. It just requires agents to engage in reasoning governed by
rationality principles not spelled out in standard normative decision theory in order
to figure out what specific choice it is that the Choice Principle recommends. This
reinterpretation of preference clarifies and strengthens the role normative decision
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theory would play in a complete account of practical rationality, without stopping
decision theorists from black-boxing questions of preference formation in their work.
While the alternative interpretation of normative decision theory I have proposed
does not require a revision of the Rationality and Choice Principles, or an expan-
sion of the kinds of questions decision theory deals with, it does have substantive
implications for decision theorists. For one, as we have seen, it changes what recom-
mendations decision theory makes in cases where all-things-considered judgements
about prospects are mistaken. It also introduces an additional layer of uncertainty for
agents and decision analysts, as any advice of the theory will depend on whether the
agent’s or the analyst’s all-things-considered judgement correctly reflects the agent’s
subjective reasons. However, it strikes me that this is how it should be; the recom-
mendations of decision theory should come with such a caveat. And, as I have argued
above, including such a caveat does not violate internalism.
Moreover, and importantly for Bradley’s project, the alternative interpretation of
preference I have proposed also changes how we should think about incompleteness of
preference. For the judgementalist, preferences are incomplete whenever an agent has
not made an all-things-considered judgement about some choice-relevant prospects.
And, whenever they are incomplete, which we can expect to be the case quite fre-
quently, agents are only constrained by the all-things-considered judgements they
have made. On the account I have proposed, incompleteness is going to be less fre-
quent: At least some of the time, when an agent has not made an all-things-considered
judgement about a prospect, there is still a fact of the matter as to what all-things-
considered judgement would be supported by all her subjective reasons. The agent
simply has not made the corresponding judgement (yet). In such cases, a preference
can still be ascribed on my account. The question we need to ask when determining
whether preferences are incomplete, is whether an agent’s underlying subjective rea-
sons leave it indeterminate which of two prospects should be favoured. I believe agents
do find themselves in such situations, for instance when their underlying attitudes are
vague. But this phenomenon will be less frequent. And, again, it seems as it should be
to reserve imprecise decision theory to this more specific phenomenon, as it is just in
this case that rationality is intuitively permissive.
8 Conclusions
According to the judgementalist interpretation of normative decision theory, prefer-
ences are all-things-considered judgements of desirability, explanatorily and concep-
tually prior to any quantitative notion of of utility or desirability, and the only attitudes
that rationally constrain choice. Judgementalism seems to be motivated by internal-
ism about rational requirements. But I have argued that even the internalist about
rational requirements should reject judgementalism. Attitudes other than preferences
in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice, and this ultimately renders a
different interpretation of preference more plausible for the internalist.
Early on in Decision Theory with a Human Face, Bradley distinguishes between
two interpretations of the Choice Principle: Doing what is in one’s best interest, on
the one hand, and doing “what one thinks is best, all things considered, in the light of
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one’s beliefs and preferences” (p. 25). He endorses the latter, and rejects the former on
the basis that it yields rational requirements that are not internal. What I have argued
here is that internalism about rational requirements more plausibly supports a third
alternative, namely that the Choice Principle demands that agents do what is best,
all-things-considered, in the light of their beliefs and judgements of desirability.
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